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Appellate Practice & Procedure
by K. Todd Butler*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article reviews cases decided in 2003 by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that have the greatest bearing on
issues of federal appellate procedure for attorneys practicing in the
Eleventh Circuit. Topics reviewed include parties' designation of
matters appealed in the Notice of Appeal; parties' actions taken during
or prior to trial to preserve issues for appeal; the interlocutory jurisdiction of appellate courts; the lack of appellate jurisdiction resulting from
the mootness of issues appealed; and the invited error and judicial
estoppel rules.
II.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

An appeal of right is initiated when the appellant files a Notice of
Appeal with the clerk of the district court that rendered the decision and
from which appeal is sought pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. 1 The "[N]otice of [A]ppeal deprives the district
court of jurisdiction over all issues" that are subject to the appeal as
noticed pursuant to Rule 32 Lacking jurisdiction, the district court may
take no further action on the case, other than action in furtherance of
the appeal or action with respect to matters collateral to the appeal.3
In Mahone v. Ray,4 the Eleventh Circuit held that after the filing of a
Notice of Appeal, the district court retains jurisdiction to deny motions

* Associate in the firm of Boone & Stone, Atlanta and Blakely, Georgia, and West Palm
Beach, Florida. Florida State University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1994); Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1999). Member, Mercer Law
Review (1997-1999). Member, State Bars of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama.
1. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1).
2. Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2003).
3. Id.
4. 326 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2003).
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made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5
However, the district court does not have jurisdiction to enter an order
granting the same motion; the district court can only indicate to the
appellate court that it believes the arguments raised are meritorious.6
Rule 3 provides additional instructions regarding Notices of Appeal,
including instructions on matters of content, service, and payment of
fees. 7 For example, an appellant must "designate the judgment, order,
or part thereof being appealed" in the Notice of Appeal.8 In Whetstone
Candy Co. v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,9 plaintiff-appellant's notice of appeal
designated the district court's summary judgment as the judgment from
which it was appealing, but it did not designate an order dismissing a
co-defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction.1" By specifically including the summary judgment in the Notice of Appeal and failing to list the
dismissal of a co-defendant, the appellant effectively deprived the
appellate court of jurisdiction over the co-defendant dismissal issue.1
Note, however, if the Notice of Appeal clearly shows that appellant's
"overriding intent" was to effectuate an appeal of a judgment, order, or
any part of the judgment or order, technical failure to make designations
in the notice will not defeat the appeal.12
III.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL

In Burke v. Ruttenberg,3 the State of Wisconsin Investment Board
("SWIB") appealed an order of the District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama allocating attorney fees in a securities class action
suit. In an effort to reduce the amount of attorney fees, SWIB argued
on appeal that, because it was the party with the greatest financial
interest in the relief sought and because it otherwise satisfied the
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 it

5. Id. at 1180. Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for relief
from judgments or orders for various reasons including, but not limited to, discovery of
mistakes or discovery of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by one of the adverse
parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
6. Mahone, 326 F.3d at 1180.
7. FED. R. App. P. 3.
8. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B).
9. 351 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 2003).
10. Id. at 1079.
11. Id. at 1079-80. See also Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater,
351 F.3d 1112, 1115 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003).
12. See Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 738-39 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980).
13. 317 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2003).
14. FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
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should have been appointed lead plaintiff.' 5 The district court had
appointed a committee of lead plaintiffs, in which SWIB participated, to
direct the litigation. SWIB wanted its contract with its own attorneys
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a reduction in the amount of attorney fees accordingly. SWIB attempted
to force the reduction after it consented to the settlement obtained by the
attorneys for the lead plaintiffs' committee.' 6 The Eleventh Circuit
held that by consenting to the settlement, SWIB failed to adequately
preserve any right to appeal the settlement. 17 However, the Eleventh
Circuit remanded the case to the district court because a district court
order allocating attorney fees among counsel for lead plaintiff's
committees in securities class action lawsuits should contain findings of
fact and the court's rationale for the allocation.'"
When district courts deny qualified immunity to government officials
in cases arising out of official action or inaction in performing discretionary duties, government officials are entitled to immediate interlocutory
review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.'9 Nevertheless, the government official
can waive the affirmative defense of qualified immunity by failing to
properly preserve it for appeal or by waiving it at trial.20 In Bogle v.
McLure,2' defendants tried to establish the defense of qualified
immunity, which "offers complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacity if their conduct 'does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.'" 22 Defendants argued that reasonable
public officials in their positions would not have known that the actions
forming the basis of the 42 U.S.C. § 198323 action against them violated
The
the clearly established constitutional rights of plaintiffs.2 4
Eleventh Circuit denied this argument because defendants waived the
right to appeal the district court's refusal to grant them qualified
immunity. 25 In fact, defendants stipulated at trial that they "never

15.

317 F.3d at 1263. SWIB's argument was based on 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2000).

Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Presumably, jurisdiction to hear the appeals would be based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (2000). Id.
18. Id.
19. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-25 (1985); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
20. Bogle v. McLure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1355 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003).
21. 332 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2003).
22. Id. at 1355 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
24. 332 F.3d at 1355 n.5.
25. Id.
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argued that [they] didn't know that transferring people based on their
race is against the law," and they knew "absolutely" that "it was a
violation of federal law to transfer people on the basis of their race."26
By stipulating that they knew that their conduct would constitute a
violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, defendants waived the right
to appeal. 7
Failure to object to the district court's procedure for enforcing an
injunction will be deemed a waiver of an appeal based on the defective
procedure because the objection is necessary to preserve the issue for
appeal.2" However, a party that undertakes to comply with an injunction, and does not specifically object to entry of the injunction, does not
necessarily waive its right to appeal.2 9 In Four Seasons Hotels &
Resorts, B.V v. Consorcio Barr, S.A.," ° defendant-appellant did not
object to the prohibitory portion of an injunction, stating instead that it
had "no problem with [it]" because it was not engaging in the activity
the injunction prohibited. 3 Plaintiff-appellee argued the appeal was
mooted by appellant's consent to the injunction, 32 but the Eleventh
Circuit held appellant's consent was substantively a denial of wrongdoing. 3
Appellant's affirmative denial that it was engaging in the
enjoined activity preserved the issue for appeal, even though appellant
had offered no opposition to the district court's injunctive order.34
Similar to Bogle,35 the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Russell v. North
36
stands for the proposition that on appeal, a party
Broward Hospital,
may not argue a case to the appellate court different from the one
argued to the district court." In Russell plaintiff had been disciplined
for unscheduled absences on three occasions over the course of two and
one-half years prior to suffering an on-the-job injury on May 31, 2000.
At least some of plaintiff's absences prior to her injury appear to have
been related to bouts of depression and migraine headaches. Because of
the injury, plaintiff missed approximately thirty hours of work from May

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Reynolds v. McInnes, 338 F.3d 1201, 1209 (11th Cir. 2003).
29. See Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205,
1209 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003).
30. 320 F.3d 1205 (lth Cir. 2003).
31. Id. at 1209-10 n.2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 332 F.3d at 1355 n.5.
36. 346 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2003).
37. Id. at 1341 (citing Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 769 (11th Cir. 1998)).
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31, 2000 to June 9, 2000. On June 12, 2000, plaintiff was terminated for
excessive absenteeism. At trial plaintiff attempted to prove, under the
Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")," that she was terminated in
accrued to her after her injury.39 Plaintiff also alleged that defendant
retaliated against her for filing a claim under the Florida Workers
Compensation Act, and she amended her complaint to allege a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.40 The jury returned a verdict for the employer
based in part on the trial court's instruction that under 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(11) and 29 C.F.R. § 825.114, 4 ' a serious medical condition
warranting excused absence under FMLA required "three consecutive
calendar days, 72 hours or more" of incapacity.12 The district court
denied plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the
alternative, for a new trial.43
On appeal plaintiff argued that if the discipline she received prior to
her injury contributed to defendant's decision to terminate her, the
reprimands and suspension were nevertheless illegally imposed on her
for exercising her FMLA rights." Plaintiff's argument on appeal would
have effectively changed the entire posture of the case.45 Under FMLA
an employee may have either an "interference" claim or a "retaliation"
claim.46 Plaintiff originally had alleged a retaliation claim, which is
more difficult to prove because retaliation claims require an employeeplaintiff to show state of mind or that the employer was "motivated by
an impermissible retaliatory or discriminatory animus."47 Interference
claims are easier to establish because they require a plaintiff to show
4
Though plaintiff's
only that she was entitled to and denied a benefitY.
had
ties to the employer's
counsel
suggested
that
the
FMLA
claim
trial
progressive discipline policy, counsel nevertheless acknowledged on the
record that no FMLA claim was being asserted for the discipline imposed

38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
39. 346 F.3d at 1338-40.
40. Id. at 1339.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (1995).
42. 346 F.3d at 1337, 1340.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1340-41.
45. Id. at 1341.
46. Id. at 1340.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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for illness-related absences prior to the May 31, 2000 injury.4 9 Accordingly, the appellate court refused to hear plaintiff's argument. °
Bogle and Russell both stand for the general rule that "'a federal
appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below."''
However, courts have held that when an issue was not brought to the
attention of the trial court, the appellate court may nevertheless review
the issue if the proper resolution of the case is beyond any doubt 52 or
if injustice might otherwise result.53
IV.

INTERLOCUTORY JURISDICTION

In 2003 the Eleventh Circuit decided a number of cases addressing its
jurisdiction to review interlocutory appeals. Emphasis was on the
court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 129154 to review decisions denying
a government agent qualified immunity, and the court's jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)5 5 to review denials of class certifications.
In Cottone v. Jenne,56 defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) 57 motion to
dismiss, claiming qualified immunity as government officials sued for the
consequences of action they took or failed to take while performing
discretionary duties. The District Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied defendants' motion.58 The Eleventh Circuit held that it
had jurisdiction over defendants' appeal from an order denying their
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.59 Likewise, in Gonzalez
v. Reno6" and Dalrymple v. Reno,61 cases arising out of the Elian
Gonzalez affair,62 the Eleventh Circuit held it had jurisdiction over
United States Attorney General Janet Reno's appeal of the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida's orders denying her motions

49. Id. at 1341.
50. Id.
51. Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. W & 0, Inc., 213 F.3d
600, 620 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., 918 F.2d 1491, 1495
(11th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
52. Iraola, 325 F.3d at 1284-85 (citing Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353
(1962)).
53. Id. (citing Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
56. 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003).
57. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
58. 326 F.3d at 1357.
59. Id. at 1357 n.5.
60. 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).
61. 334 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2003).
62. Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1228; Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 991.
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to dismiss based on qualified immunity.6 3 The Eleventh Circuit's
jurisdiction in each of these cases was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.6 As
the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Mitchell v. Forsyth,6 5
when a party raises the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, or the
right not to stand trial at all, the order has to be reviewed before
67
trial. 66 Otherwise, the order cannot be effectively reviewed at all.
As a rule, an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 must be from an order
concluding the litigation.6 ' The Eleventh Circuit, as a court of limited
jurisdiction, will review an appeal to ensure that it is under § 1291 and
that it is brought from a final order.6" The court will dismiss the
appeal if it is not.7" Under the collateral order doctrine, however,
section 1291 gives the courts of appeal jurisdiction over orders if they
"(1) 'conclusively determine the disputed question'; (2) 'resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action'; and
71
[are] (3) 'effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.'"
The denial of class certification is not a final order over which a
federal appellate court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,72 but
a plaintiff seeking class certification may nevertheless request the
73
appellate court's discretionary jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Furthermore, discretionary jurisdiction of the appeal may lie even if the
legally cognizable interest of the plaintiff seeking class representative
status has been rendered moot.7 4 The legally cognizable interest in the

63. Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1233; Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 994.
64. Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1233; Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 994. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and
1295 of this title.
65. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
66. Id. at 525.
67. Id.
68. See SEC v. Carrillo, 325 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. United States ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292, 1300-01 (11th
Cir. 2003) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
72. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468-69 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
73. Id. at 474-75 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000)).
74. See Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Serv., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1245-47 (11th
Cir. 2003) (citing United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980)).
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traditional sense may no longer exist, but the plaintiff seeking class
representative status may nevertheless retain a legally cognizable
interest in his procedural right to represent a class of similarly situated
persons.75 Of course, a district court's order denying class certification
cannot be reviewed on appeal until the order is actually entered.7 6 If
the district court enters an order effectively mooting the legally
cognizable interests of a plaintiff seeking class representative status, the
district court must nevertheless determine the question of class
certification before entering an order dismissing the case.77
In Cameron-Grantv. Maxim HealthcareServices, Inc.,78 the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction over a plaintiff's appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in an action brought pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 9 The court further determined whether
it had jurisdiction analogous to its jurisdiction to review an order
denying class certification even after the plaintiff and class representative's legally cognizable interest has been mooted.8 ' A plaintiff can
have no procedural interest in class certification under Rule 23 in a
FLSA action because FLSA precludes Rule 23 actions by requiring all
employee-party plaintiffs to a FLSA action to consent in writing to being
a party plaintiff and to file that consent in the court where the FLSA
action is pending."' Nevertheless, plaintiff in Cameron-Grant, along
with three other named plaintiffs, moved for an order permitting court
supervised notice to be given to other potential plaintiffs regarding their
potential right to opt in as co-plaintiffs.8 2 Such an order would have
the effect of permitting a class action under FLSA, though not under
Rule 23.83 Prior to the court entering an order on their motion, three
of the named plaintiffs dismissed their claims with prejudice, and
defendant stipulated it would pay the remaining plaintiff's unpaid wages
and overtime pay. After the district court denied the motion for court
supervised notice to potential plaintiffs, plaintiff settled all of his
remaining claims against defendant, and the district court entered an

75. See id.
76. Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 1215-16.
78. 347 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2003).
79. Id. at 1242; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2003).
80. 347 F.3d at 1245-47.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1996); but see Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1215-16
(remanding question of class certification to district court in FLSA case).
82. 347 F.3d at 1243.
83. Id. at 1243 n.2 (citing Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.
2001)).
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order dismissing the case with prejudice. 4 The Eleventh Circuit held
that it did have jurisdiction of the appeal, observing that the opt-in
requirement of a class action derived from 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)"8 makes
it "a fundamentally different creature than the Rule 23 class action. " "
Rule 23 contemplates a procedural right to bring an action that might
affect otherwise uninvolved persons, while § 216(b) requires all persons
who may
be affected to take affirmative steps to become involved in the
7
action.
Because Congress provided detailed instructions in 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B) for selecting lead plaintiffs in securities class actions, the
Eleventh Circuit also suggested that district courts should consider
certifying related issues for interlocutory appeal.""
V.

MOOTNESS

The doctrine of mootness requires the appellate court to determine
whether, in a case on appeal, the issues presented are still "live," or
whether the parties to the appeal still have a legally cognizable interest
in the court ruling on the issue. 9 If the justiciability doctrine of
mootness is not satisfied, it will deprive a federal court, including a court
of appeals, of jurisdiction.9 ° If the case "'no longer presents a live
controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief,"
the case is moot. 9' Events occurring subsequent to the Notice of Appeal
that deprive the appellate court of the ability to give such meaningful
relief deprive the court of jurisdiction.92 There are, of course, a number
of policy considerations that may allow a federal court to retain
jurisdiction of an issue, despite an apparent inability to provide
Such considerations
meaningful relief to the plaintiff in particular. 9
include continuing collateral consequences of the matter appealed from

84. Id. at 1244.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1996).
86. 347 F.3d at 1249 (citing LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th
Cir. 1975)).
87. Id.
88. Burke v. Ruttenberg, 317 F.3d 1261, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003); 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B) (2000).
89. Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1119 (11th
Cir. 2003) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
90. Id.
91. De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 1993)).
92. Id. (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001)).
93. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 2.5.2-2.5.4, at 128-39 (2d ed.
1994).
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and wrongs that the doctrine of mootness would enable to be repeated
because they would never be subject to review.94
Changes in the law provide one example of events subsequent to the
Notice of Appeal that can render a case moot.95 Such changes can
include legislative repeal of statutes, expiration of statutes that contain
built-in expiration dates, or judicial decisions overruling earlier judicial
decisions in which the appellant claimed a defense or an enforceable
right.96 However, a case is not rendered moot simply due to a change
in the law on which an appellant's claim was based.9" In Granite State
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Clearwater," defendant repeatedly
denied plaintiff's applications for permits to erect signs that were
substantially larger than signs allowed by defendant's ordinances.
Plaintiff sought injunctive relief alleging that defendant's ordinances
unconstitutionally restricted commercial speech. The district court
denied relief, and on appeal, defendant argued that plaintiff's claim had
been rendered moot because the city changed the allegedly unconstitutional ordinance. 99 However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the issue
remained alive, and plaintiff continued to have a justiciable interest in
the controversy because plaintiff had requested damages.'0 0 Also, if
adjudication of an issue is required to prevent legislative reenactment
of an unconstitutionally objectionable law, then the
doctrine of mootness
0 1
does not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction.
VI.

INVITED ERROR AND JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL

"'It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not
challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that
party.""' 2
This "cardinal rule" is known as the "invited error"
rule."0 3 In 2003 the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue in two cases:

94. See id.
95. See id. § 2.5.1, at 125-26.
96. See id.
97. See Granite State OutdoorAdver., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1119.
98. 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 1114-15, 1119.
100. Id. at 1119.
101. Id. (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at § 2.5.4.
102. Birmingham Steel Corp. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 353 F.3d 1331, 1340 n.5 (11th Cir.
2003) (quoting Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1147 (2003)); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1290 (11th
Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 988 (11th Cir. 1997)).
103. See Birmingham Steel Corp., 353 F.3d at 1340.
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Birmingham Steel Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Authority114 and Glassroth
v. Moore.1" 5
A party does not invite error simply by arguing alternative positions
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certification as representative of a class of industrial customers having
Economy Surplus Power ("ESP") contracts with the Tennessee Valley
Authority ("TVA").' °7 During the litigation and after the order certifying the class, plaintiff, as class representative, filed a petition for
protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.'
Defendant moved to decertify the class because the Notice of Class
Action approved by the district court specifically stated that recipients
of the notice were not included in the class if they were in bankruptcy.
In the alternative, defendant moved to stay proceedings until a
substitute class representative could be found. Counsel for the class
argued that the class should not be decertified because, even though the
notice excluded bankrupt companies, the TVA's bankrupt ESP customers
were not excluded from the definition of the class. In the alternative,
counsel for plaintiff and the class argued that the definition of the class
should be amended to include such customers. 0 9
At the decertification hearing, the district court focused on questions
related to difficulties that might arise from the legal and practical
problems associated with a bankruptcy liquidator serving as class
representative. The district court also addressed issues related to
identifying and substituting a new class representative. The court
recognized that having certified the class, the court was obligated to
allow class counsel a reasonable amount of time to identify a substitute
class representative. However, rather than emphasizing the court's
obligation to allow class counsel time to identify a new class member
willing to be substituted as class representative, counsel for the class
focused on the difficulties associated with finding a new class representative. One argument was that current TVA customers who were
members of the class would be unwilling to risk souring their ongoing
business relationship with TVA by becoming a class representative. The
district court then entered an order decertifying the class and indicated,
with regard to substitution of a new class representative, that no party

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

353 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2003).
335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
Birmingham Steel Corp., 353 F.3d at 1341.
Id. at 1333.
Id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
353 F.3d at 1333.
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had asked to allow a different class member to serve as class representative.110
Counsel for the class moved for an order staying, or otherwise
delaying, decertification until other class members could be notified and
given an opportunity to intervene as a substituted class representative."' The district court denied the motion, noting that there was no
motion to substitute a new class representative for plaintiff, and in
earlier arguments, "class counsel had repeatedly emphasized how slim
were the chances that a new representative could be found."'12 On
appeal defendant argued that the earlier argument of class counsel
regarding the difficulty of finding a substituted class representative
The Elevconstituted either "invited error" or "judicial estoppel.""'
enth Circuit noted that the class counsel expressed pessimism about the
possibility of identifying a substituted class representative." 4 Class
counsel had nevertheless alerted the district court that it would take the
position that the class should have a reasonable opportunity to seek a
substituted representative if it were determined that Birmingham Steel
No invited error or
could not continue as class representative."'
judicial estoppel resulted from the mere fact that class counsel had
focused its attention on "vigorously" opposing defendant's argument that
the class should be decertified because Birmingham Steel was no longer
a suitable class representative." 6
In Glassroth the Eleventh Circuit was presented with a scenario in
which invited error did in fact prevent an appellant from maintaining an
appeal." 7 The case involved the now famous affair of "Roy's Rock" in
which former Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore installed
a monument to the Ten Commandments in the rotunda of the Alabama
Supreme Court building. While deciding whether the monument should
be removed from the rotunda for violating the Establishment Clause of

110. Id. at 1334.
111. Id. at 1334-35.
112. Id. at 1335.
113. Id. at 1340-41. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that "'prohibit[s] parties
from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.'" Id. at
1340-41 n.6 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001)). "In the
Eleventh Circuit, the inconsistent positions must have been made under oath and must
have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system." Id. (citing Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, 260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated on othergrounds, 537
U.S. 1085 (2002)) (citing Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419, 1422 (11th Cir.1998)).
114. Id. at 1341-42.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1341.
117. 335 F.3d at 1289-90.
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the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,"18 the district
court judge hearing the matter went to the rotunda to view the
monument. The court entered judgment finding that the monument was
i
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effect of requiring the monument to be removed. Chief Justice Moore
refused to remove the monument within the court-imposed thirty-day
period, requiring the court to enter an order enjoining the Chief Justice's
defiance. 119
On appeal counsel for Chief Justice Moore argued that the district
court judge inappropriately based his determination that the monument
violated the Establishment Clause on the judge's view of the monument.'2 ° The Eleventh Circuit first pointed out that it is appropriate
for the judge or jury, as fact finders, to obtain evidence from a view of
a scene.' 2' Caveats include a requirement that fact finders should not
undertake an uninvited view of a scene outside the knowledge or
presence of counsel, and evidence obtained from a view should not serve
as the basis of findings of fact should the case be decided on summary
judgment. 22 More importantly, the Chief Justice's counsel had urged
the district court judge to visit the Alabama Supreme Court rotunda to
view the monument, stating that it was "incumbent upon" and "necessary" for the judge to visit the rotunda to see the monument and observe
the scene.' 23 The court noted:
Counsel for the Chief Justice agreed with [plaintiffs'] statement about
how the view should be conducted, and he made clear that the whole
point was for the district court judge to be able to gather facts about
the monument and its setting, saying: ... [the judge is] a jury. You
124
have to walk in and see what you see... just like a juror would."
The Eleventh Circuit held that such action was not simply invited
error but "invited error with a parking space. "125

118. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST.amend I.
119. 335 F.3d at 1288.
120. Id. at 1289.
121. Id. at 1289-90.
122. Id. at 1289.
123. Id. at 1290.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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